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Ubiquitous commodity?
Quick show of hands
2
Hostile back door?
Quick show of hands #2
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How did we get to where we are now?
•RFC821 defined original transport mechanism
•Written by Jon Postel (also IP, DNS, ICMP, TCP...)
•NEVER UPDATED
•RFC822 defined original Internet Message Format
•Updated 5 times, mainly protocol interoperability/MIME etc
•Both finally superseded in April 2001 (2821/2322)
•Then again in October 2008 (5321/5322)
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Early days – August 1982
• Everyone “knew” everyone else
• And had access to their modes in some cases!
• Mutual trust & technical knowledge
• Original protocols built to reflect that trust
So... Old protocols
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• Commercialisation happened
• ...and other things, like the expansion of higher 
education across the world
• Email became ‘de facto’ communication method
• Most people sending email don’t care about protocols
• But they still trust each other
Old protocols... New users
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• Trust is a complex issue, many influences
• “Fake news”, conspiracies, embarrassment
• Psychology
• Ubiquity
• Easy to spoof, difficult to verify validity
YOU HAVE WON
OR HAVE A TAX REBATE
OR A PARCEL OR WE SAW YOU BEING NAUGHTY
7
• First ‘spam’ in 1978 on ARPANET
• Not strictly email, massively frowned upon, no repeats
• USENET spam
• First commercial in 1994 –marketing, from a law firm!
• Dam broken
• Email spam
• Followed the USENET days
• Slow start but rapidly a problem (Sanford Wallace 1997 on)
• Malware followed suit quickly in 1999
• ‘Happy99’, Melissa, Kak)
Evolution of usage – and misuse
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• Ubiquity
• Trust (again)
• Extremely hostile and the door is always open
• Whack-a-mole
Now
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• Anti-spam, anti-malware, reputation
• Multi $billion business sector, commercial & FLOSS solutions
• Scale, though...
• Email verification++
• SPF (DNS TXT RR asserts source IP validity)
• DomainKeys (deprecated)
• DKIM (asserts message integrity via cryptographic sig via DNS TXT RR)
• DMARC (DNS TXT RR combines SPF+DKIM -> handling policy)
• DANE (DNSSEC method for cert validation, also force SMTPS)
• ARC (Authenticated Received Chain)
And what now/next?
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• Scale: we’re not all mega-size like Google & MS
• Many FLOSS tools available
• rspamd, Apache SpamAssassin, ClamAV, DNS Blacklists (and whitelists!), 
“keep score”
• ClamAV has Google’s Safebrowsing database available
• Filtering up front before the client browser
• Watch for protocol violations
• Bad syntax, egregious format violations etc
Use defence in depth
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• It’s an ever-changing battlefield
• The bad actors are almost always one step ahead
• Your users will inevitably trust someone they should not
• Or stop trusting someone they should!
• Credential loss/leakage, financial loss, data loss/leakage
• Loughborough trialling an RPZ solution
• ‘Standard’ resolver deployment with redirector
• In-house SpamAssassin plugin to catch messages on the way in
Use defence in depth (2)
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TRUST
NOBODY
And remember...
13
Graeme Fowler
Senior IT Services Specialist, IT Services, Loughborough University
G.E.Fowler@lboro.ac.uk
Thank you, any questions?
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